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IN EASTERN EUROPE 
To assess the situation and outlook in the Eastern European countries 
and their external relations over the nex t Iew years. 
CONCLUSIONS 
A. Eastern Europe has entered upon its third post-Stalin phase. 
The years 1953-1957 were n1arkecl by popular upheavals and the 
danger of disintegration, and the next several years by consolidation 
and relative quiet. The present is inarke -::1 once n1ore by a preoccupa-
tion vvith change and \Ve look for a period of political liveliness and 
fluidity. (Paras. 1-11 , 22) 
B. In the n1inds of n1ost Eastern Europeans, however, the basic 
fact of C0111111unist rule is not nO\V in dispute. It is rather the question 
of the national future, within the frainework of a Con1n1unist system, 
which is being subjected to exan1ination and experin1ent. The in-
ternal issues are those of liberalization and cconon1ic refonn. These 
in turn are closely related to the problen1s of autonon1y within the 
Con1n1unist can1p and relations with the West. Increasingly, the 
leaders of Eastern Europe are feeling free to approach these questions 
less in the light of Soviet \vishes or the supposed con1n1on interests 
of the Bloc, inore in the light of national aspirations and local political 
conditions. (Paras. 8, 12, 24) 
C. One result of this trend, which is likely to continue for the next 
several years, is a gro\ving diversification in Eastern Europe. Out-
siders, including the USSH, will find it increasingly hard to apply a 
general analysis and a general policy to the area. We expect in 
1nost of these countries s01ne inove1nent to\var<l political liberalization 
and a search for better balance and inore efficient inetho<ls in inanaging 
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the econ0111y. Econ0111ic progress, while likely to show son1e improve-
111ent over the generally disn1al record of the last two years, will not 
be such as to din1inish dissatisfaction and in1patience in the near 
future. Political evolution is not likely to proceed at a speed 'Which 
threatens the C0111111unist regin1es. (Paras. 22, 24-25, 29-.'30, 33) 
D. In external relations, we expect a sin1ilar uneven evolution away 
fr0111 the tutelage of Nloscow and toward closer contacts with Western 
Europe and the US. We believe that the Soviets would consider direct 
i11ilitary intervention in Eastern Europe only in emergency circumstan-
ces, when they believed vital Soviet interests to be threatened. 
In political tern1s, the irreducible Soviet de111and probably is that these 
regin1es should ren1ain professedly Comn1unist and continue at least 
fon11al ine111bership in the Warsaw Pact. So long as these limits are 
not transgressed we believe that the USSR is prepared to tolerate con-
siderable divergence in internal policies and even to acquiesce re-
luctantly in further i11anifestations of independence in foreign policy. 
:\lost countries will aln1ost certainly seek to develop their economic 
and cultural relations with the West at a rapid rate, though the econ-
on1ies of Eastern Europe will re111ain closely tied to that of the USSR. 
( Paras. 24, 31-32, 34, 36) 
E. Though \Ve believe that these trends will unfold gradually and 
without n1ajor upheavals, we are conscious of the possibility of sharp 
instability and even violent shifts. The chances of change of this 
sort depend to son1e extent upon each country's success in n1anaging 
cl0111estie; problen1s and party factionalisn1. Develop111ents in the 
Soviet Union will probably be eq_ually iinportant. If the USSR con-
tinues to falter in its c0111petition with the West, to lose prestige in 
the contest \vithin the Con1n1unist n1ovc111ent, or to give an in1pression 
of uncertainty in its policy, Eastern European nationalisn1 inay be 
inoved to holder ventures. These possibilities \vill also be heightened 
during the succession period in Soviet politics, \Vhich is likely to breed 
factionalisn1, nervousness, and exaggerated hopes and fears in Eastern 
Europe. (Paras. 26-27) 
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DISCUSSION 
I. THE SITUATION IN EASTERN EUROPE 
The USSR and Eastern Europe 
l. \\-hen Stalin died in 1953, Soviet control over Eastern Europe was strong 
and the Satellite regimes could not have survived without it. Stalin had as-
sured direct political control by installing obsequious leaders such as Rakosi 
and Bierut and supervising them on the spot through Soviet ambassadors and 
periodically through official party emissaries. Stalin had also frequently en-
gineered purges within the Communist parties to eliminate real or potential 
dissidents. The secret police were controlled from Moscow by an elaborate 
system of Soviet "advisers" and by direct penetration at all levels. Soviet offi-
cers controlled the Satellite armed forces, with the help of Soviet "advisers" 
attached to staffs dmvn to fieldgrade level. Political control was augmented by 
direct control over the economies, which were still being exploited by the 
USSR. :\foscow supervised all planning, trade was largely limited to Bloc 
partners, and contact of every kind with the outside world was minimal. 
2. Upon coming to power, Khrushchev regarded it as important to correct 
what he considered to be Stalin's gross errors of policy towards Eastern 
Europe-in particular, his blatant exploitation of the Satellite economies and 
his arbitrary, coercive approach. He therefore set out to establish Soviet rela-
tions wM1 these countries on a new basis-one 'vhich relied less on coercion 
and more on voluntary cooperation. Khrushchev also considered it a major 
error that Yugoslavia had been excluded from the bloc of Communist stat.es, 
and he strove to bring Yugoslavia back into it. 
3. Khrushchev made some progress in 1955 and early 1956, but the convul-
sions in Poland and Hungary later that year showed that he had seriously 
underestimated the problem. Clearly the Communist regimes '"ere not sb·ongly 
enough established to resist nationalism and pressures for liberalization. Ac-
cordingly, in 1957, Khrushchev moved to reconstitute the fabric of Soviet au-
lhority in Eastern Europe, in the process calling on Chinese assistance and 
thereby encouraging Peiping's larger ambitions. The Bloc was consolidated at 
the 'Moscow conference that year, but at the price of the continued exclusion 
of Yugoslavia. 
4. \Vhen in later years the dispute bet\\ een the USSH. and China became 
evident, the role of each individual Communist party took on new importance. 1 
Not only was Soviet authority openly challenged, but China's insistence on a 
general condemnation of Yugoshwia made that country again a central prob-
1 For a fuller <lisc:;ussion of tlie impad of the Sino-So, iel dispute on Eastern Europe, sec 
l\IE 10-2-64, "Prospects for the International Communist MO\ cment," dated 10 June 1964, 
paragraphs 7-12. 
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lem in Bloc politics. The interaction of these two developments led to a 
serious Soviet defeat in Eastern Europe, when Albania successfully defied the 
USSR and joined with China against Moscow. The Albanian leaders' hostility 
to Khrushchev and to his rapprochement with Tito arose from their acute 
fears of a Moscow-Belgrade conspiracy to restore Yugoslav hegemony over 
Albania. The Soviets were unable by political subversion and pressure or by 
economic sanctions to bring the Albanians to heel and proved unwilling to 
resort to military force because of the practical and political difficulties involved. 
5. As the Sino-Soviet dispute intensified, Klu·ushchev was forced to defend 
more vigorously his efforts to re-establish some relationship between Tito and 
the Soviet Bloc. Despite the lessons of 1955-1956, the imperatives of the Sino-
Soviet conflict led Khrushchev to urge the other East Europeans to follow 
the Soviet lead in improving relations with Yugoslavia. In this process, how-
ever, Khrushchev was forced to accept Tito largely on the latter's own terms. 
In fact, Khrushchev recognized Tito's "different road" to socialism, and even 
publicly endorsed certain Yugoslav innovations in Communist development. 
The Yugoslav and Albanian examples thus combined to suggest that the USSR 
on the one hand favored considerable autonomy, and on the other was limited 
in its ability to enforce predetermined limits. 
6. This Soviet predicament has been dramatically demonstrated more recently 
by the behavior of Rumania. Rumanian intransigence was the product, prima-
rily, of Gheorghiu-Dej's early opposition to de-Stalinization, of longstanding eco-
nomic grievances against the USSR, and of increased confidence as a result of eco-
nomic successes. Determined to pursue rapid industrialization come what may, 
the Rumanians refused to modify their economic development program in spite 
of pressure by the USSR and other Communist countries. An awakening na-
tionalism, encouraged since 1962 by Soviet concessions to national sovereignty, has 
prompted the Rumanians to act more and more independently in various aspects 
of foreign policy. They have refused to support Soviet actions against China, 
and have even presumptuously offered to mediate the Sino-Soviet conflict. In 
April 1964 they openly declared their determination to act as an independent 
Communist country. 
7. Meanwhile, in the early sixties, the pattern of relations in Eastern Europe 
was also affected by developments outside the Communist world. One factor 
of major importance was the new view of the world strategic balance which 
was a worldwide consequence of the Cuban missile crisis in 1962. Previously, 
East European Communists had been led to believe that the Soviets possessed 
an advantage in strategic weapons which would enable them to make major 
gains against the West. The crisis, however, made it evident that, far from 
possessing such an advantage, the Soviets were forced to draw back, and to 
alter their tactics toward the West. Similarly, the evident prosperity and 
vitality of Western Europe in the sixties cast doubt on Communist contentions 
about the direction of history and excited simple envy. The general result 
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was to reduce Soviet prestige in Eastern Europe and encourage thinking about 
the future in more nationalistic terms. 
Factors of Change 
8. The consequence of this history is that, while the Soviet presence in Eastern 
Europe remains strong, there is now considerable scope for indigenous factors 
\\·hich 8l'C potenbally inimical to that presence. Probably the strongest of 
these is nati01ulism, \ivhjch has reappeared in dynamic form, most notably in 
Rumania and Slovakia. vVhatever its direct targets and its peripheral benefits 
to certain Soviet policies (as in continuing fears of West Germany), nationalism 
in Eastern Europe is essentially incompatible with Soviet domination. Further, 
it is, as an emotional force, a particularly difficult form of opposition and 
pressure for the Soviets to combat. This is especially the case when it is able 
to gain a firm hold on the minds of the Communist leaders themselves, as it 
did in Hungary and Poland in 1956 and seems to be doing in Hum,rnia in 
1964. In any case, few Eastern European Communist leaders remain who 
arc ready to execute Soviet desires without regard to the implications for their 
own country. 
9. Related to this development is a trend away from a doctrinaire approach 
and tO\vard greater moderation in internal policy. Throughout the area, the 
men who led in establishing the present regimes are growing old and arP 
giving way gradually to a new generation whose experience with communism 
is not in staging a revolution but in managing a state. Whereas many of the 
attitudes and habits of the older leaders were conditioned by early training 
in the USSR, by revolutionary fervor, and by close ties with the Soviet party, 
many of the younger leaders, having no such bonds, tend to respond more to 
the needs and traditional attitudes of their own countries. 
10. The gradual trend away from doctrinaire policies has also been the 
result of economic necessity. The realization is growing, especially in the 
more industrialized countries, that adequate economic performance depends 
increasingly on care and sophistication in planning and management. But in 
spite of much experimentation, there has been no real progress toward devising 
effective incentives in economies still run predominantly by command. Already, 
however, greater restraint is apparent in the adoption of less ambitious economic 
plans, a fact which should diminish the likelihood of serious mistakes and 
create more favorable conditions for technical and qualitative improvements. 
11. Finally, throughout Eastern Europe the intelligentsia are exerting stronger 
pressures to end their isolation from the \Vest and to find a way back to an 
association with cultural trends in Europe. They have been stimulated by 
periodic relaxations in Soviet cultural controls and by various official policies, 
such as increased encouragement of tourism, exchanges with the West, and 
discontinued or <liminishcd jamming of Western broadcasts. Some of the 
leaders, such as Kadar, sec benefits to themselves in accommodating these 




12. We believe that, barring external shocks, the Communist regimes are 
now fairly well established in Eastern Europe. They have developed strong 
apparatuses of power, and are able either to anticipate most problems of public 
order before they arise or to suppress them if they do. Moreover, the peoples 
of these countries for the most part have in the course of some 18 years become 
resigned to the continued existence of some form of Communist rule. The 
experience of 1956 in Hungary was especially instructive in bringing home 
the realization that they could expect little if any help from the West if they 
tried themselves to overthrow the Communist authorities. 
13. Many problems continue, nonetheless, as potential threats to stability. 
General popular dissatisfaction with these regimes and their policies persists. 
Living conditions are a major source of discontent, especially in Poland and 
Czechoslovakia. Another problem, intellectual agitation for greater freedom 
and more contact with the West, has stimulated both popular disaffection and 
disagreement within and among the various parties. Indeed, factional differ-
ences continue to plague the Communist parties, and to weaken the positions 
of some present leaders. Finally, revived nationalism has in some cases 
stimulated these differences, and in others has affected the attitudes and policies 
of the Communist leaders themselves. 
14. In contrast to the relatively rosy economic picture in Eastern Europe 
during the late fifties, a marked decline has occurred during the early sixties 
in rates of economic growth in the more industrially developed countries. 
In Czechoslovakia, industrial production actually fell in 1963 and GNP has 
scarcely increased at all for two years. There are a number of reasons for 
this decline of industrial growth in the northern countries. Industry is being 
operated virtually at full capacity, and especially in East Germany there is 
no longer a potential for easy growth through the use of existing plant. Except 
in Poland there is no longer a surplus of agricultural labor for use in industry. 
Foreign and domestic customers are demanding a more rapid improvement 
of technology and quality than the economies have been able to achieve under 
an inflexible system of economic management. Some temporary factors, such 
as grossly unrealistic planning and unfavorable weather conditions, have also 
contributed to the slowdown. In most of Eastern Europe agricultural pro-
duction has stagnated, and there has been little improvement in personal 
consumption. 
15. In Czechoslovakia the serious state of the economy has had important 
political effects. Dissatisfaction with Novotny's mishandling of the economy 
has joined with resentment against his slowness and clumsiness in de-Staliniza-
tion. As a result, outspoken criticism of the leadership occurred and demands 
were voiced in the press, especially in Slovakia, for justice to Stalinist purge 
victims and retribution against the purgers. These developments considerably 
sharpened traditional Czech-Slovak antagonism in the party and population, 
forcing Novotny to sacrifice some of his closest associates in the leadership 
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and to make important political and economic concessions. Indeed, internal 
dissension came close last year to unseating Novotny himself. His concessions 
have by no means mollified the opposition, which continues to agitate for 
less doctrinaire and less restrictive policies. These developments have been 
accompanied by an intellectual ferment almost as intense as those in Poland 
and Hungary in 1955-1956, and by the re-emergence of nationalist fervor 
among Slovaks. 
16. In Poland, Gomulka's popular image has deteriorated greatly since 
1956, and he has also lost stature in the Communist Party. Though not nearly 
so intense or clearly defined as in 1956-1957, factionalism within the party 
has again become an important problem for Gomulka. The conservative or 
hard-line group, whose main strength is in the internal security apparatus, is 
manifestly out of sympathy with Gomulka's policies, and for that matter with 
Khrushchev's, which they consider much too "soft." The opposing faction, 
\vhich has representatives in many ministries and among intellectuals, criticizes 
Gomulka for failure to get the economy moving and for imposing too many 
restrictions on political and social activity. With some justice, this group 
charges that the hard-liners are anti-Semitic and desire to restore discredited 
Stalinist policies. Further, there is widespread popular impatience with the 
failure of the Gomulka regime to achieve the expected improvement in living 
conditions, and with increasing restrictions imposed by the regime in daily 
life. The continuing conflict between Church and State also imposes strains 
within the government and upon the populace. 
17. In East Germany, the Ulbricht regime continues to be greatly appre-
hensive of its populace and remains almost completely dependent on Soviet 
protection. Ulbricht has been a loyal instrument of Moscow during the 
GDR's entire existence, but his age and health have reached the point where 
someone else may shortly have to assume the burdens of his post. None of 
the likely candidates appears to possess his skills and experience, and the 
Soviets doubtless will be forced to carefully oversee developments during a 
succession period. The East German leaders are greatly concerned over the 
effect among their own intelligentsia of cultural currents and more liberal 
policies elsewhere in Eastern Europe, especially in Czechoslovakia. SED 
leaders several times have been moved to express open disapproval of develop-
ments in that counb·y. Such cultural currents are making it more and more 
difficult for the Ulbricht regime to continue to suppress kindred developments 
in the GDR. 
18. In Hungary, Kadar appears to have consolidated his leadership over his 
party. At the same time he has placed his country quietly on a gradualist 
and pragmatic course which has improved the political and economic climate. 
In this he has developed incentives and has encouraged participation in his 
internal program on the basis of practical rather than political qualification. 
Ile has even used Hungarian national feeling to his own advantage. In the 
process he has lost a good deal of his stigma as a Soviet puppet. 
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19. In Bulgarb, on the other hand, Zhivkov seems largely to have failed 
'vhere Kadar has succeeded. Zhivkov's abilities and his policies are not held 
in high regard by important elements in the party which would prefer to be led 
by the ousted Stalinist leader, Chervenkov, or the former premier, Yugov. 
These elements seize every opportunity (e.g., the Georgiev spy case last winter) 
to trv to discredit Zhivkov and force a return to a more conservative line. 
NeYe'rtheless, Zhivkov's position is greatly fortified by demonstrations of strong 
Soviet support; his willingness to follow Khrushchev's lead in both foreign 
~.nd domestic policies has been rewarded by the extensioa of some $600,000,000 
in Soviet economic aid during the past several months. In any case, the prin-
cipal issues within the Bulgarian party do not now seem to center around the 
question of Bulgaria's relations with the USSR; thus Zhivkov's removal would 
probably not lead to any "declaration of independence" by his successors. 
20. \Vhile economic growth was slowing down in the northern countries, 
Humania was booming. It achieved an unusually high rate of industrial growth 
during 1961-1963, mainly because consistently good harvests since 1958 and the 
availabilitv of \Vestern credits enabled the regime to finance greatly increased 
imports ;f industrial materials, machinery, and equipment from the West. 
Rumania's success in industrialization and its acquisition of modern up-to-date 
\Vestern equipment increased the confidence of the Communist leaders, en-
couraging them to adopt a nationalistic position, especially in economic policy. 
21. The Gheorghiu-Dej regime has until recently been reluctant to relax 
its coercive methods of control. Gheorghiu-Dej has long favored strict, even 
Stalinist, methods and has opposed the introduction of de-Stalinization in 
numania, partly because he felt this might undermine his own position. Yet 
the revival of nationaiism in the past few years has strengthened the unity of 
the leadership and has helped the regime to find common ground with the 
populace, a process which the recently announced wage increases and tax cuts 
should assist. The considerable expansion in contacts and exchanges with 
the West has also had an ameliorative effect. Certain measures taken by the 
regime-principally the extensive release of political prisoners-suggest that 
the regime now feels able to relax its coercive policies toward the populace. 
II. PROSPECTS 
General 
22. We believe that the next few years in Eastern Europe will be characterizPd 
by continued change and Hui<lity. In the political sphere, many regimes prob-
ably will attempt to enlist the support of a larger proportion of the populace. 
This would mean further curbs on the police and security organs, continued 
sufferance, within limits, of cultural ferment and the exchange of ideas, and 
greater tolerution of non-Communist participation in public life. Greater leni-
ency in internal policy wiU encourage, and be encouraged by, the development 
of closer cultural and political tics \vith Western countries. In the economic 
sphere, the regime; probably will tend to be more pragmatically inclined in 
their policies than in the past, and to place more reliance on incentives and less 
on political exhortation and manipulation. This trend will also be stimulated 
by the development of broader economic contacts with the West. 
23. Nevertheless, the Communist regimes will still be swayed by the impera-
tives of the Communist system and their relations with the USSR. Some of 
them probably will be forced at times to employ harsh methods of control, 
and at other times to quicken the pace of economic or political concessions to 
the populace. Much will depend on the course of Soviet policy and the USSR's 
relations with the vVest and Communist China. 
24. Generalizations will be more and more difficult to make about Eastern 
Europe. With the examples of Yugoslavia, Albania, and now Rumania before 
them, other Eastern European regimes can increasingly feel free to approach 
their problems in the light of national aspirations and the local political situa-
tion, saving their wholehearted endorsements of Soviet policy for those cases 
in which they truly share a common interest with the USSR. Traditional na-
tional antagonisms probably will again become important in relations between 
these countries, and between some of them and the USSR. Friction has already 
been apparent in relations between the Communist regimes of Hungary and 
Rumania over treatment of the Hungarian minority in Transylvania. v\le think 
that other differences of this kind will probably appear between some of these 
countries, and between some of them and Yugoslavia. 
The Outlook for Political Stability 
25. The Communist regimes are probably sufficiently strong and experienced 
to maintain public order. East Germany is the exception; the regime is chronic-
ally unstable, but the strong Soviet forces there are in a position to crush any 
disturbances quickly. Since the people are aware of this fact and remember 
1953, such disturbances are not likely under present circumstances. 
26. While we believe that change in Eastern Europe will be gradual, we do 
not exclude the possibility of sudden and even violent shifts. In each country, 
the chances of change of this sort depend to some extent upon success in con-
taining popular dissatisfaction and avoiding gross economic mistakes. Even 
more important, stability will be endangered if the party proves unable to con-
fine within its own upper circles the factionalism endemic to Communist politics. 
The disintegration which threatened the Polish party and overtook the Hun-
garian party in 1956 could proceed only because intraparty divisions came to 
involve the rank-and-file membership and the urban population as well. The 
Czechoslovak regime is currently experiencing difficulty of this nature, and a 
succession problem could intensify this danger in almost any of these countries. 
But we believe that, over the next few years, the various regimes will maintain 
sufficient unity to preserve essential stability. 
27. Equally important will be the influence of developments in the Soviet 
Union. If the USSR continues to falter in its military and economic competition 
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with the US, loses further prestige in the contest within the international Com-
munist movement, and gives a continuing impression of uncertainty in its policy 
toward Eastern Europe, nationalism will be encouraged to bolder ventures. A 
particular threat to stability lies in the prospect of a succession struggle in the 
USSH; unless this is avoided or quickly ended, factionalism in Moscow will 
almost certainly breed factionalism, nervousness, and exaggerated hopes and 
fears in Eastern Europe. This would encourage some Communist leaders to 
test more vigorously the limits of Soviet permissiveness. Others, particularly 
those whose popular support was narrowest, would try to strengthen domestic 
discipline and to reinforce this by a close indentification with the USSR. 
28. The Gomulka regime, though still the most permissive in Eastern Europe, 
has retrogressed considerably from the degree of freedom which existed in 1956 
and 1957, and some further encroachments on the freedom of the Poles are 
likely in the next few years. The regime will proceed cautiously, however, since 
it is aware that such a course could bring popular resentment to a dangerous 
point. The Novotny regime has had to do much to liberalize its internal policies 
in the past year or so; we believe that this trend will continue and that the 
other regimes will be influenced by it. vVe also expect the trend toward mod-
eration to continue in Hungary. The Ulbricht regime is unlikely to alter its 
fundamental policies, although it may make some gestures, with Soviet encour-
agement, to ease internal pressures. 
The Economic Outlook 
29. The more industrialized countries of Eastern Europe are unlikely to find 
a quick way out of their difficulties. We expect in general that growth rates 
of the East European economies will be considerably below the levels achieved 
in the 1950's, although above those of 1962-1963. Such an economic performance 
is lilely to be disappointing to the regimes in most of Eastern Europe and thus 
to he a source of contention over economic policy. Pressure will probably in-
crease for givfog a higher priority to raising personal consumption and reform-
ing the economic system. In any event, it will take several years before living 
condition:, in the industrialif'cd countries can be improved markedly, so that 
popular impatience and dissatisfaction will probably remain strong. 
30. \Ve believe that many of these countries will continue to experiment with 
reforms of the economiL: system. Increased reliance probably \\ill be placed 
on economic rather than ideological factors in planning, and further attempts 
made to simplify state controls, to increase the authority of enterprises in deter-
mining product assortment alld methods of production, and to further improve 
price systems and incentives. Experiments also probably will be made toward 
allO\\ ing con.)umcr demand to determine the assortment of consumer goods pro-
duced, and in making production for export more responsive to foreign demand. 
Changes 110\\ under consideration in Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Po-
land, for example, are apparently of this nature. Such factors, howe\ er, as 
prudence, vested lmremwratic interests, mid ideological conservatism will limit 
10 
..--- SECRFF -
the pace of <..:hange and produce occasional reversals. The basic characteristics 
of central planning, state O\vnership, and collective agriculture will persist for 
a long tir11e to come. 
31. Vile believe that these countries will seek to develop closer economic rela-
tions with the \Nest. The more industrialized countries are making serious 
efforts to produce manufactured goods meeting world standards. This is a long-
n·.nge effort, lmt in the interim the developed \Vest is showing an increased 
willingne3s to finance East European trade with credits. Rumania's special 
advantage-a surplus of basic commodities readily salable outside the Bloc-
will depend to some extent on future agricultural conditions. As East European 
industry acquires advanced equipment from the \Vest, this will increase de-
pendence on non-Bloc sources for maintenance and new technology. 
32. Closer economic ties with the West vvill probably be accompanied by im-
proved relations in the political and cultural fields, and we expect \Vestern 
Etu-ope to be increasingly active in the next few years in attempts to exploit 
the changing situation. There are very strong traditional cultural bonds be-
tween many Eastern European peoples and the West, for example, those be-
tween Rumania and France; a marked revival of these ties would tend to leaven 
internal policy and encourage independence of the USSR. The Federal Re-
public is improving trade and cultural relations with these countries and even-
tually may find a formula permitting diplomatic relations. This may help to 
mitigate popular fears in Eastern Europe of a "resurgent" and "revanchist" West 
Germany, although the critical element here is Bonn's position with regard to 
frontiers. The prospect of improved relations between West Germany and East-
ern Europe tends to undermine the position of East Germany. This effect is 
already evident in the "Berlin Clause" in recent trade agreements between \Nest 
Germany and several Eastern European governments. 
Relations Among Communist Countries 
33. We thus believe that, over the next few years, the domin :mt trend in East-
ern Europe will be toward diversity, toward autonomy within the framework of 
Joosening Soviet rule. This trend presently benefits from the USSTI's detente 
t::i.ctics toward the vVest and the still evolving Sino-Soviet dispute. Future 
developments in these spheres may intrude in an important way to check the 
processes of change in Eastern Europe. In general, however, we believe that 
the factors mElking for diversity and autonomy have vigorous roots, and that 
shifts in Soviet policy are more likely lo affect the pace of this process than 
to reverse it. 
34. As one consequence of this trend, we believe that economic cooperation 
among the CEMA countries will continue to develop primarily along bilateral 
lines. Rumania's current stmd on this issue, which probably evokes considerable 
sympathy elsewhere, makes it unlikely that the Soviets will press broad schemes 
of economic integration for the entire nrea. There is, however, further scope 
for mutually advantageous specialization, p<.rticularly amung the more developed 
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countries. In any event, and even though trade with the vVest will almost 
certainly increase, the economies of Eastern Europe will remain closely tied 
to that of the USSR. 
35. Rumania's successful assertion of national interests may stimulate similar 
moves by other East European states. For the most part, however, these 
regimes are likely to proceed in a circumspect fashion. Rather than openly 
differing with Soviet policy, for example, they will tend to press for a greater 
voice in the formulation of general Bloc policy prior to Moscow's official promul-
gations; rather than openly attacking CEMA, they will bargain for increased 
Soviet assistance and better terms of trade. Nevertheless, nationalism has on 
occasion led to bold and injudicious acts in Eastern Europe, and dramatic con-
flicts can by no means be ruled out in the future. 
36. In such instances, the reassertion of Soviet authority would prove a very 
difficult matter. Political techniques of control have been much weakened, and 
we believe that the Soviets would consider direct military intervention in 
Eastern Europe only in emergency circumstances, when they believed vital 
Soviet interests to be threatened. In political terms, the irreducible Soviet 
demand probably is that these regimes should remain professedly Communist 
and continue at least formal membership in the Warsaw Pact. So long as 
these limits are not transgressed, we believe that the USSR is prepared to tolerate 
considerable divergence in internal policies and even to acquiesce reluctantly 
in further manifestations of independence in foreign policy. On other matters 
than the Warsaw Pact, perhaps Yugoslavia's position suggests the political limits 
of what the USSR, under sustained pressure, would be willing gradually to 
permit to other East European governments. 
37. The Soviet strategic stake in Eastern Europe is complex. Soviet forces 
stationed there, particularly in East Germany, play an important role in Sovjet 
strategy for general war, in maintaining stability in East Germany, and in 
deterring West Germany from thoughts of reunification by force. The air 
defense systems of Eastern Europe are coordinated with the Soviet system and 
for most practical purposes constitute an extension of that system; they provide 
both additional warning time and active defense against aircraft attacking the 
USSR from Western Europe. So long as attack by aircraft from the west can 
deliver substantial megatonnage on the USSR, the air defenses of Eastern 
Europe will be of great importance to the Soviets. All these concerns might 
be reduced by future developments in the German question and European 
security arrangements, but a complete Soviet withdrawal from East Germany 
could only be undertaken as part of a fundamental chang,e in Soviet policy 
toward Central Europe. 
38. Within these political and strategic limits, however, the Soviets probably 
will have to accommodate themselves to an incre~sing expression of national 
interests in Eastern Europe. In particular, they are likely to acquiesce in a 
considerable increase in Easte.:n Eurol1e's economic and cultural relations with 
the West, including the US. In this matter they will Rnd it difficult to press 
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on their allies a more restrictive policy than the USSH. itself practices. Thus 
we believe that the concern for self-preservation among the Communist regimes 
of Eastern Europe will be more important than Soviet misgivings and dis-
pleasure in limiting their economic and cultural relations with the West. 
39. The patterns of change in East Europe are bound to be affected by and 
in turn to influence the German question. For some time to come the fear 
of Germany is likely to be one of Moscow's strongest cards in Prague and War-
saw. All the Eastern European governments are likely to see little to be 
gained from upsetting the status quo in Central Europe. Nevertheless, these 
attitudes are not permanently fixed, and they depend to a great degree on the 
situation in East and West Germany. Already, the West Germans have opened 
new lines of contacts and exchanges that could affect the attitudes of East 
Europeans, particularly those less directly concerned with Germany. At the 
same time, it is doubtful that East Germany can safely afford to follow the 
trends toward nationalism and liberalization of internal controls developing else-
where in East Europe. It is thus conceivable that the difficulties arising from 
East Germany's anomalous position in Europe will become increasingly im-
portant both to the USSR and to the other Communist countries. Though other 
factors \Vill be of great importance, such an evolution of attitudes is one of the 
developments which might lead to a Soviet re-evaluation of its German policy. 
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